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Abstract: Under the TRIPs Agreement, all member-countries of the World Trade Organization  
are required to provide an "effective" system of plant variety protection within a specific time 
frame. In many developing countries this has led to a divisive debate about the fundamental 
desirability of extending intellectual property rights to agriculture. But empirical studies on the 
economic impacts of PVP, especially its ability to generate large private sector investments in 
plant breeding and facilitate the transfer of technology, have been very limited. This paper 
examines two aspects of the international experience of PVP legislation thus far (i) The 
relationship between legislation, R&D expenditures and PVP grants, i.e., the innovation effect, 
and (ii) The role of PVP in facilitating the flow of varieties across countries, i.e., the 
transferability effect. 
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Under the TRIPs Agreement
1, all member-countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
are required to provide an "effective" system of plant variety protection (PVP) within a specific 
time frame. In many developing countries this has led to a divisive debate about the fundamental 
desirability of extending intellectual property rights (IPRs) to agriculture. But empirical studies 
on the economic impacts of PVP, especially its ability to generate large private sector 
investments in plant breeding and facilitate the transfer of technology, have been very limited. 
This paper examines two aspects of the international experience of PVP legislation thus far (i) 
The relationship between R&D expenditures and PVP grants and (ii) The role of PVP in 
facilitating the flow of varieties across countries. This analysis can generate useful insights for 
policy makers in developing countries on the design of PVP systems and the allocation of 
research responsibilities between the public and private sectors. 
 
Plant variety protection is a form of IPRs for new varieties of plants, which is akin to patents but 
with some important differences
2. The argument from the perspective of developed countries for 
the inclusion of IPRs in the Uruguay Round was that the absence of IPRs in developing 
countries meant the loss of substantial markets for their companies. But two important economic 
arguments were advanced to developing countries for the extension of IPRs to plant varieties. 
The first argument was that IPRs were necessary to encourage private investment in plant 
breeding and create incentives for innovations in plant breeding. Given the self-reproducing 
nature of seed and the difficulty in appropriating returns from a new variety faced by plant 
breeders, private investment would not be forthcoming in the absence of IPRs. The second was 
that in the absence of IPRs, superior varieties bred in the developed world (increasingly 
proprietary or protected varieties developed in the private sector) would not be offered to them 
at all, given the fear that any competitor could freely replicate and sell these varieties. A related 
argument pertains to the incentives created by PVP for foreign participation in domestic plant 
breeding research. The transfer of "finished" plant varieties, advanced breeding lines, germplasm 
and breeding technologies can come about as a consequence of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in the seeds sector or through technical collaboration agreements between domestic and foreign 
firms. In the absence of an IPR regime that allows sufficient appropriability of returns from new 
varieties, foreign participation in domestic plant breeding may be discouraged. 
 
An important empirical question in this context is how the strength of IPR protection and R&D 
expenditures influence ‘innovations’ i.e. the development of new plant varieties. We will 
explore the nature of this relationship using data from developed OECD countries. There have 
been no previous empirical studies of the transfer of protected varieties across countries 
although there have been some studies of the transferability of agriculture related inventions (see 
Evenson: 1990). In this paper we will examine data for thirty UPOV member-countries to assess 
the extent to which protected plant varieties have moved across countries with PVP legislation 
and the relative importance of different mechanisms of transfer. We will examine the 
                                                           
1 Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which formed part of the Agreement 
constituting the WTO. 
2 Two important differences between plant variety protection and patents are that PVP generally allows for farmers’ 
exemption and researchers’ exemption, which are not allowed under patents. The former allows farmers to use to 
seeds of a protected variety saved from the harvest for replanting his land in subsequent seasons without payment of 
royalty to the breeder and the latter allows researchers to use a protected variety as an “initial source of variation” in 
the development of other new varieties.   2
participation of foreigners in the acquisition of PVP certificates in different countries and the 
factors that determine foreigners’ share.  
 
Innovation: Variables and Data 
 
The patents-R&D relationship has been studied at the firm level by several authors (e.g. 
Hausman et. al :1984); Montalvo :1997; Cincera :1997; Blundell, et. al. :1995; Foltz et al: 2000). 
Plant variety certificates as outputs of research processes are more homogeneous than patents 
from across a wide variety of industries and this is an advantage for the analysis of the PVP 
certificate-R&D relationship. However, data on a key variable in explaining PVP certificates, 
agricultural R&D expenditures, are not available at the firm level. Thus, while total R&D 
expenditure of firms is obtainable from international databases, the proportions that are spent on 
activities related to new plant variety generation is unknown. This problem is significant 
because many giant “life-science” companies that play a major role in the development of new 
varieties also invest heavily in R&D in related areas such as agro-chemicals, agricultural 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. Therefore, our analysis is performed at the country level, 
with a cross-section of 13 countries observed over time periods varying from 6 to 9 years over 
the 1990s. This does bring up the issue of multi-country protection. A country-level panel 
regards individual countries as separate elements in the cross-section. But this specification 
becomes hard to justify if firms engage in significant multi-country PVP activity for a given set 
of varieties. However, at risk of giving the plot away, the later part of the paper actually finds 
that the transferability of varieties is markedly low. This enables us to be more comfortable with 
our representation than we otherwise might have been. The 13 countries in the database were 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden and UK.  
 
 
Count Data Methods 
In modelling the effects of market size, R&D spending and PVP legislation upon PVP grants, it 
is important to recognize that data on the dependent variable are different from data in typical 
regression models in three ways: non-negativity, the prevalence of a higher proportion of zeros, 
and the integer nature of the data. Thus basic assumptions of OLS and linear panel data models, 
such as normality of the residuals are no longer satisfied, and appropriate ‘count’ data methods 
have to be used. The number of PVP grants made in any country in a given year is a typical 
example of count data. The Poisson regression model has been widely used to study such data. 
In principle, such data can be analysed using conventional multiple linear regression. But 
Poisson models can improve upon least squares and linear models by explicitly taking into 
account the discrete nature of the dependent variable and the large number of zeroes that often 
characterise these data. For instance, in any year it is possible that owing to administrative 
reasons, or the time lag involved in testing, no grants are made, while in another year the grants 
may be “bunched”. 
 
The Poisson regression model specifies that each yi (e.g. the number of grants made in country i) 
is drawn from a Poisson distribution with parameter λi which is related to the regressors xi. The 












= =  
The most common formulation for λi is the log-linear model: 
Ln λi = β′xi 
Where xi are explanatory variables and β′ is a vector of coefficients. It can be shown that the 
expected number of events (e.g. PVP grants per period) is:   3
E(yi | xi) =Variance (yi | xi) =  λi  = e
β′x
 
The Poisson model can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. The log-likelihood 
function is: 
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β is generally estimated by software programmes using the Newton-Raphson iterative algorithm 
(Greene: 1995). 
 
Poisson models can be extended to panel data (Hausman, Hall and Griliches: 1984). The 
approaches to accommodating heterogeneity of individual units in panel data are the fixed 
effects specification and the random effects specification. In the fixed effects specification, the 
individual (country) specific effects are treated as being correlated with the included exogenous 
variables. In the random effects specification, the individual specific effects are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the exogenous variables and to be randomly distributed among individual 
units. A random effects specification was adopted as the country specific effects influencing 
grants – namely coverage of genera/species in PVP legislation, agro-climatic conditions 
affecting the development of new varieties and the potential for spillover of varieties from 
abroad- were unlikely to be correlated with the explanatory variables included in the equation. 
The formulation adopted for λi was: 
 
 
Ln λit  = 
 
Constant + b1 Ln (MARKET)it + b2 Ln (PATENT)it + b3 Ln (RD)i,t-1 +  
b4 Ln (RD)i,t-2 + b5 Ln (RD)i,t-3 + b6 Ln(RD)i,t-4 +  b7 Ln (SPILLSTK) 
 
where i indexes countries and t indexes time periods, the dependent variable is the observed 
number of grants PVP grants (GRANTS) and   
 
 
MARKET             =    Size of the market for agricultural inputs. 
 
PATENT               =   Index of strength of IPR system. 
 
RD                        =  Lagged values of agriculture research expenditure by public and 
private sector institutions in a country. 
 
SPILLSTK            =  Cumulative stock of PVP certificates in other countries. 
 
A larger size of the market for seeds can be expected to lead to a larger number of grants. A key 
hypothesis was that stronger IPR regimes lead to the development and protection of more 
varieties. R&D expenditures can be expected to a have a positive effect on the number of grants. 
We have noted earlier that once PVP is introduced, it tends to become the norm for breeders (in 
both the public and private sectors) to protect their varieties. Therefore, if more R&D 
expenditures lead to the development of more new varieties, then the coefficients of the lagged 
values of R&D expenditures should be positive. However, if the potential for innovation is 
getting exhausted, then it is possible that the coefficients may be negative reflecting the 
diminution of opportunities for innovation. The number of lags of R&D expenditures used in the   4
estimation was dictated by the availability of data. Given the time lags in the breeding process, 
the most recent expenditures were not expected to have the highest impact on grants. 
 
The spill-in variable, represented by the cumulative stock of PVP certificates in other countries, 
was also expected to have a positive impact on grants. The harmonisation of PVP legislation in 
different countries through the UPOV Convention is intended to enable breeders to seek 
protection for their varieties in several countries. All the countries included in the sample are 
members of the UPOV Convention and allow “national treatment” to nationals of other UPOV 
member-countries. This is likely to increase the possibilities of spill-ins. As PVP regimes 
become more mature, the benefits from protection might be more easily perceived and the 
number of grants may tend to increase with time. However, a trend variable was not included in 
the equation because it was found to be highly collinear with the spill-in variable.  
 
Results  
The results of the count data regressions are presented in Table 1 below. The table presents 
results from two alternative models. The overall Poisson model does not account for the 
heterogeneity of individual units, essentially treating the entire sample as a single cross section. 
It is mainly presented in order to provide comparison with the specification of choice, the 
random effects Poisson model.  
Table 1: Determinants of PVP Grants  – Count Data Regression Results 
 
Dependent variable: Grants        Mean =307.54       Std. Deviation=345.54   No. of 
observations= 104 
  Overall Poisson  Random Effects Poisson 
  Co-efficient  Std. Error  Co-efficient  Std. Error 
Constant -2.71**  0.27  -2.71  2.18 
Ln MARKET   0.37**  .0.008  0.26**  0.012 
Ln PATENT   5.68**  .074  5.69**  0.17 
Ln RDi,t-1   0.18**  .05  0.21**  0.032 
Ln RDi,t-2   0.37**  0.065  0.42**  0.047 
Ln RDi,t-3   0.48**  0.061  0.58**  0.034 
Ln RDi,t-4 -0.99**  0.046  -0.80**  0.031 




0.04 -  0.41  - 
Ln SPILLSTK  -0.26**  0.022  0.035**  0.008 
Alpha -  -  0.43*  0.27 
** Significant at 1% level of significance 
* Significant at 10% level of significance 
# This is the sum of the coefficients of Ln RDi,t-1, 
Ln RDi,t-2, Ln RDi,t-3 and Ln RDi,t-4 and not a 




PEARSON   =  0.60 
R
2
DEVIANCE   = 0.57 
Log-likelihood of Poisson regression with no group effects   
=-8438.625 
Restricted log-likelihood of Poisson regression with no group effects (all βs =0)   
=-19586.96 
Log-likelihood of Poisson effects with group effects (random effects specification)  
=-2999.067 
The overall fit of the model as revealed by the R
2
PEARSON  and R
2
DEVIANCE  is good and a 
reasonable degree of stability is observed between the two models. All the coefficients (except   5
the constant and α) are significant at the 1% level of significance. There is a considerable 
increase in the log-likelihood for the random effects specification when compared to the overall 
Poisson specifications. The coefficient of the value of agricultural output is positive and 
significant, which implies that more varieties are developed and offered for protection when the 
market size is larger. This is also consistent with the results from the previous section, which 
showed that, for specific crops, the “saturation” level is a function of the volume of output.  A 
key result from Table-1 is that an increase in the strength of IPR protection leads to an increase 
in grants. A stronger PVP legislation will, therefore, encourage a larger number of varieties to be 
offered for protection. For countries with relatively weak IPR regimes in our sample like 
Canada, Finland and Ireland, this implies that moving up closer to the OECD average for regime 
strength could mean a significant improvement in varietal development and protection. It should 
be noted that as the specification for λit is of the form Ln λit =β′xit and the xit are all in log form, 
the coefficients are also the elasticities. A 10% increase in the value of the index results in a 
56.9% increase in the number of varieties offered for protection.  
The coefficient on the spill-in variable is positive and significant but small in absolute terms. 
What this implies is that an exogenous increase in the stock of PVP certificates in other 
countries results in a statistically significant but small increase in varietal protection in the home 
country. A 10% increase in the world stock of PVP certificates results in only a 0.3% increase in 
PVP certificates in the home country. This implies that the transferability of varieties across 
countries with PVP is very limited. This conclusion is reinforced later in the paper, where we 
find that the incidence of multi-country protection of varieties is extremely limited. This may be 
either because varieties bred in one country are not suitable for use in other countries or because 
PVP by itself does little to facilitate the transfer of varieties between countries. It is possible that 
the use of the cumulative stock of PVP certificates in other countries is a less than perfect 
representation of spillover possibilities. In practice, it may be only the cumulative stock of valid 
PVP certificates that may reflect the potential for spillovers. If the PVP certificate for a variety 
has been surrendered in one country owing to lack of commercial potential, it is unlikely to be 
offered for protection in another country. However, the estimation could not be attempted using 
the stock of valid certificates as the spill-in variable, as the relevant data were not available for 
some countries in the sample.  
The overall Poisson specification and the random effects specification produce similar 
coefficients for the R&D expenditure variables. The coefficients of the first three lags are 
positive and significant while the fourth lag is negative and larger than the first three in absolute 
value. It is conventional in the patents-R&D literature to look at the sum of lagged R&D 
coefficients in addition to the individual ones. The sum from the random effects specification 
indicates that the effect of R&D expenditures on PVP grants is positive and quite strong. A 10% 
increase in R&D spending over four years results in a 4.1% increase in PVP grants. The 
development of a new variety may require several generations of breeding and crossing. The 
coefficients of 0.21, 0.42 and 0.58 for the first three lags of the R&D expenditures reflect the 
nature of the plant breeding process
3. A 10% increase in the previous year’s R&D expenditure is 
seen to increase the number of varieties offered for protection only by 2.1%, while a similar 
increase in periods (t-2) and (t-3) generates an increase in grants of 4.2% and 5.8% respectively. 
From the point of view of development of finished varieties, the R&D expenditures in (t-2) and 
(t-3) have the maximum impact. A negative and significant coefficient for the fourth lag is 
counter-intuitive but this has been a common enough feature in the patent-R&D literature. In 
fact many of these studies report a U-shaped lag structure (Hausman et al.: 1984; Cincera 1997). 
Pakes and Griliches (1980) speculate that the later lags in these models might be influenced by 
                                                           
3 It must be noted that the explanatory variables are the lagged values of agricultural R&D expenditures and not the 
value of plant breeding R&D expenditures (for which no data are available). The elasticity of grants with respect to 
plant breeding expenditures could be higher.    6






The indicator that we will use to assess the impact of PVP on the transferability of varieties is 
the incidence of multi-country protection of plant varieties. Plant variety rights obtained under 
PVP legislation are national in scope, i.e. rights granted in one country are independent of rights 
granted in any other country (UPOV: 1994). Protection in each country has to be applied for and 
obtained separately; though a breeder who gets his variety protected in one UPOV member-state 
enjoys a ‘rights of priority’ (discussed later) for getting it protected in other member-states. 
When a breeder in country i decides to protect his variety by getting a PVP certificate in country 
i, he/she has also the option of obtaining (for a cost) a PVP certificate in country j. Decisions 
regarding the exercise of this option are informative regarding direct international spillovers 
between country i and j. The breeder in country i (having already determined that the variety is 
worth protecting in country i) will assess the likely market for the variety in country j. Protection 
is likely to be sought in country j only if the returns from marketing the variety in country j are 
likely to exceed the transaction costs of obtaining protection (Evenson: 2000). The incidence of 
multi-country protection is, therefore, an indicator of the transferability of varieties across 
countries. It is an indicator of the extent to which varieties protected in one country command a 
market in other countries. It is this indicator that we will use in our analysis. We shall refer to 
the spread (spillover) of plant varieties through the acquisition of IPRs in different countries as 
the flow or movement of varieties. If PVP does facilitate the transfer of plant varieties between 
countries, then we would expect to see significant flows of varieties across countries with PVP 
systems.  
 
 The PVP legislation of most countries provides for ‘national treatment’ of foreigners, which is a 
requirement under both the UPOV Convention and the TRIPs Agreement. This implies that 
foreigners (both natural and legal persons) have the same right to protect their varieties as 
nationals. Foreigners may acquire PVP certificates when protected varieties are directly 
transferred from one country to another (as discussed previously). However, another important 
method of acquisition of IPRs by foreigners may be acquisition of PVP certificates by entities in 
which they have a controlling interest. Such entities, which could be 100%, owned subsidiaries, 
joint ventures or companies with majority foreign shareholding could seek protection for 
varieties developed through their research programmes. The plant breeding programme of these 
entities may attempt to incorporate traits from improved varieties or lines developed elsewhere 
into locally adapted varieties, thus creating new varieties for the domestic market. In such cases, 
transfer of proprietary varieties or breeding lines and germplasm may be an adjunct to the 
investment and collaboration activities of foreigners. When PVP grants are made to foreigners 
for varieties not protected elsewhere, it is likely that the new varieties are the outcome of such 
activities.  
 
The share of PVP certificates accruing to foreigners also provides a measure of the “transfer-
effect” of PVP – either through acquisition of IPRs for varieties already developed in other 
countries or through exchanges that accompany investment and collaboration operations. If the 
latter mechanism is dominant, then the share of PVP certificates owned also foreigners create an 
                                                           
4 A large positive and significant coefficient of the last lag can be explained as the result of the influence of R&D 
expenditures prior to the sample period, which may be dying out slowly. However, what we have in our case is a 
large negative and significant coefficient on the last lag which is more problematic to explain. One plausible 
explanation in the context of plant breeding is that the negative coefficient on the lag (t-4) reflects the previous 
exploitation of the innovation pool. That is, if varieties developed from R&D expenditures in the period (t-4) and 
earlier have already been protected, then its impact in the current year may be to reduce the number of varieties that 
can be developed and offered for protection from a given innovation pool.    7
indicator of the incentives by the PVP legislation for foreigners to produce ‘innovations’ for the 
domestic market. 
 
Transfer of Protected Varieties by Crop 
The analysis of the transfer of protected varieties across 30 UPOV member-countries has been 
attempted using the database of protected varieties referred to earlier. This analysis is made 
possible by two features of the UPOV Convention that make it possible to identify varieties that 
have been protected in more than one country. These are (a) provisions regarding denomination 
of varieties and (b) provision regarding "right of priority".  The identification of varieties 
protected in more than one country was done for the following crops (1) wheat (2) maize (3) 
soybean (4) potato (5) perennial ryegrass and (6) oilseed rape. The data on varieties protected in 
more than one UPOV member-country for these six crops is summarised in Table-2.  
 
Table-2: Transfer of Protected Varieties Across UPOV Member-Countries 
 
 
Crop  Wheat  Maize  Soybean  Potato  P.Ryegras
s  Oilseed Rape 
No. of varieties for 
which PVP grants 
made 
2450  4761 1474 1408  973  978 
Varieties protected 
in: 
       
























4 countries  26     
(1.06%) 
18 






5 countries  11 
(0.44%) 
2 






6 countries  3       
(0.12%) 
2 






7 countries  2 
(0.08%) 
1 
(0.02%)  -  20 
(1.42%)  -  1 
(0.10%) 
8 countries  1 
(0.04%) 
1 
(0.02%)  -  20 
(1.42%)  -  1 
(0.10%) 
9 countries  1 
(0.04%)  - -  14 
(0.99%)  -  1 
(0.10%) 
10 countries  -  -  -  6 
(0.42%)  - - 
11 countries  2 
(0.08%)  - - 3 
(0.21%)  - - 
12 countries  - 
  - - 3 
(0.21%)  - - 
13countries - -  -  2 
(0.14%)  - - 
14 countries  -  -  -  2 
(0.14%)  - - 
15countries - -  -  3 
(0.21%)  - - 
16 countries  -  -  -  1 
(0.07%)  - - 
Varieties protected in 














Varieties protected in 












(9.71%)   8
Table-2 lists for each of the six crops the total number of varieties for which PVP grants have 
been made in 30 UPOV member-countries and the number of varieties that have been protected 
in two or more countries. 18.4% of wheat varieties, 13.7% of maize varieties, 4% of soybean 
varieties, 46.3% of potato varieties, 34.12% of ryegrass varieties and 25.56% of oilseed rape 
varieties have been protected in two or more countries. The movement of varieties appears to be 
very significant in the case of potato as more than 25% of the varieties are protected in three or 
more countries. It is the only crop where there is a variety protected in as many as 16 countries.  
 
The largest contribution to the inter-country movement of varieties is made by the category 
"varieties protected in two countries". If this category mainly reflects the movement of varieties 
between neighbouring countries having similar agro-climatic conditions (or special 
arrangements for marketing each others’ varieties) then the figures in Table-2 may be 
overestimating the extent to which PVP facilitates the international movement of varieties. The 
movement of protected varieties across regions may provide a better indicator of the role played 
by PVP in facilitating transfer. In order to assess the inter-regional flows of protected varieties 
the 30 UPOV member-countries included in Table-2 were divided into the following regional 
groups: (1) Asia (2) Australia and Africa
5 (3) Europe (4) North America (5) South America. 
 
A matrix of inter-regional flows of protected varieties is presented in Appendix-1. Each cell in 
the matrix is formed by the intersection of the "row" region and a "column" region. For example, 
the cell formed by the intersection of the row “Asia” with the column “Australia” is used to 
represent the flow of protected varieties between these two regions. Similarly the cell formed by 
the intersection of the row “Europe” and the column “Europe” is used to represent the flows of 
protected varieties between countries in European region. The percentage figure for each crop in 
each cell is calculated as: 
     (Σ Vi, j    /Total number of varieties protected in two countries)              
where Vi,j is the number of varieties protected in country i and country j, and i indexes countries 
in the row region and j indexes countries in the column region. As the matrix is a symmetric 
one, data are only entered in cells above the diagonal.  
  
Appendix-1 provides a strikingly different picture of the movement of protected varieties across 
countries. An extraordinarily high proportion of the movement of protected varieties is actually 
just the movement between European countries. The intra-European movement of protected 
varieties represents more than 90% of the “sharing” of varieties between countries in the case of 
wheat, potato, perennial ryegrass and oilseed rape and 85% in the case of maize. For maize, the 
movement of varieties between North America and Europe is significant (13%). Soybean is an 
exception where the intra-Europe flows represent only 33.3% of the total flows. Flows between 
North America and Australia (13%), North America and Europe (5.9%) and North America and 
South America (33%) are the other significant flows in the case of soybean.  
 
Even within Europe, a limited number of pairs of EU countries account for much of the intra-
Europe movement of varieties. This can be seen in Appendix-2, which lists the contribution of 
important pairs of EU countries to the intra-Europe flow. Appendix-2 also shows that a large 
part of the intra-Europe movement of varieties is the result of the varieties protected under 
national PVP systems switching to EU wide protection under the Community Plant Variety 
Office
6.  
                                                           
5 Africa was clubbed with Australia, as there was only one country in Africa with PVP - South Africa. 
6 The Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) of the EU issues PVP certificates that provide protection in the 
whole of the EU based on a single application. However, EU-wide PVP rights granted by the CPVO cannot be held 
concurrently with national rights in EU countries. For the purposes of Table-2, the CPVO has been treated as a 
separate entity (i.e. as if it were another country). If a variety was first protected in the UK and then in the CPVO, it 
means that UK protection was surrendered to obtain EU-wide rights. Therefore, a switch from national rights to 
EU-wide rights in respect of a protected variety gets reflected as “flow” from UK to CPVO.   9
 
The important country pairs that account for a large proportion of the inter-country flows in 
Europe are (1) Germany-France (2) Germany-Netherlands (3) France-Spain (4) UK- Denmark 
and (5) UK-Ireland. In the case of maize, 42.3% of all flows of protected varieties worldwide are 
accounted for by the exchanges between Germany and France. Similarly Germany and the 
Netherlands account for 31.7% of all exchanges in ryegrass. It is clear from the data presented in 
Appendices 1 and 2 that multi-country protection of plant varieties is almost entirely a European 
phenomenon confined largely to a few Western European countries. It is useful to examine the 
reasons for the large intra-European flows as it can provide insights into factors that influence 
the movement of varieties.  
 
The large intra-European flows can be partly attributed to the similarities and complementarities 
of agro-climatic conditions (McMullen: 1987). However, we do not observe large flows between 
countries of other regions where such similarities of agro-climatic conditions exist. Intra-
European flows appear to be mainly attributable to a set of measures that considerably enhance a 
breeder’s ability to appropriate returns from a new variety.  
a)  Berland and Lewontin (1986) argue that the “catalogue” and “seed certification” that 
are the two pillars of the European seed regulatory system provide de facto 
appropriability for breeders even in the absence of formal PVP systems. In the 
presence of PVP systems they act as enforcement mechanisms.  
b)  Most non-European legislation (including that of the United States) allows farmers to 
save seeds of protected varieties for planting subsequent crops. European legislation 
has, however, moved toward stringent restrictions on the use of farm-saved seed of 
protected varieties. Under arrangements worked out between farmers and breeders in 
EU countries, all farmers
7 have to pay royalty to breeders even when they use farm-
saved seed of protected varieties (the royalty payable on farm-saved seed are lower 
than those applicable to commercial seed). This restriction greatly increases the 
revenue that a breeder can derive from marketing a new protected variety.  
c)  The EU has also established a common EU-wide PVP legislation administered by the 
Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) based in France. The CPVO grants EU-
wide protection certificates. This makes it possible for a breeder to obtain protection 
for his variety in all EU countries with a single application. The transaction costs for 
obtaining protection in several markets is greatly reduced. 
 
The matrix in Appendix-1 shows that with the exception of intra-European flows (that can be 
attributed to the special factors discussed above) intra and inter-regional flows of protected plant 
varieties have been virtually nil or have been minuscule in relation to the number of varieties 
offered for protection. There is, therefore, very little evidence to support the view that PVP is an 
instrument facilitating the direct transfer of varieties across countries. PVP may be a necessary 
condition for the transfer of self/open-pollinated varieties crops bred in the private sector, but it 
is not a sufficient one. The need for plant varieties to be adapted to specific agro-climatic 
conditions inherently limits their transferability. But the experience of Europe shows that even if 
adaptability constraints do not operate, significant flows of protected plant varieties take place 
only when PVP is supplemented with measures that provide access to large markets, support 
enforcement of breeders’ rights, enhance appropriability of returns and reduce transaction costs 
for obtaining protection.  
 
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that transfers of all plant genetic resources (which 
include not only finished varieties but also “primitive cultivars, landraces, wild and weedy 
relatives” (Sedjo:1998) and breeding lines and germplasm accessions in genebanks) between 
countries are limited. It only suggests that the movement of finished plant varieties, which are 
                                                           
7 Small farmers are exempted.    10
the only elements of plant genetic resources currently subject to IPRs, is limited. Extensive 
transfers of germplasm, breeding lines and even landraces take place between public sector 
institutions in different countries (Evenson: 2000).  
 
Foreigners’ Share of PVP Certificates 
 
In this section we will attempt an econometric estimation of the determinants of (1) the number 
of grants made to foreigners and (2) the share of PVP grants accruing to foreigners. It was 
postulated that both these variables would be a function of (a) the size of the commercial market 
for seed (b) the size of the domestic research system (c) the strength of IPR protection (d) the 
openness of the economy (e) the age of PVP legislation. While the determinants of the share of 
foreigners were estimated using a conventional linear panel data model, the determinants of 
grants to foreigners were estimated using a count data regression model.  Both the estimations 
were done with data for the following 20 countries Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. The period covered 
for each country was either 1981-1998 or from the inception of PVP legislation to 1998. The 
number of observation for each country was not the same (the panel was unbalanced) because 
many countries introduced PVP after 1981.  
 
Determinants of number of grants to foreigners 
  The number of grants accruing to foreigners in each country was estimated using a panel 
Poisson model. A random effects specification was adopted as the country specific effects 
influencing grants – namely coverage of genera/species in PVP legislation, agro-climatic 
conditions affecting the transferability of varieties and the distance of the country from major 
plant breeding countries- were unlikely to be correlated with the explanatory variables included 
in the equation. The formulation adopted for λit was: 
Ln λit  =  Constant + b1 Ln (MARKET)it + b2 Ln (PATENT)it + b3 INTERACTIONit +  
b4Ln (GBRDPP)it + b5PVPAGEit + b6EFIit 
where i indexes countries and t indexes time periods, the dependent variable is the observed 
number of grants to foreigners (NRGRANT)  and  
MARKET             =           Size of the market for agricultural inputs 
 
PATENT               =   Index of strength of IPR system 
 
INTERACTION   =   Ln (MARKET) *Ln (PATENT) 
 
GBRDPP              =   Variable reflecting the size of the domestic research system 
 
PVPAGE              =   Age of PVP legislation 
 
EFI                       =   Economic Freedom Index reflecting the openness of the economy 
 
Stronger IPRs can be expected to encourage foreigners to seek more PVP grants. The potential 
for commercial sales of protected varieties is also likely to vary with the size of the market. 
Foreigners may seek more grants in larger markets. But from the point of view of the foreign 
breeder what matters is the appropriability of returns and this may be influenced by the strength 
of IPRs. The interaction term is the product of Ln (MARKET) and Ln (PATENT). The Ln 
(PATENT) in the interaction term may be seen as affecting appropriability by increasing or 
decreasing the effective size of the market. For instance, if PVP legislation places restrictions on 
the use of farm saved seed, then it would have the effect of enlarging the market for commercial 
sales of protected varieties. 
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The size of a country’s research system could affect grants to foreigners in several ways. A 
larger domestic research system may mean that foreigners face greater competition from 
domestic breeders and this could reduce the grants accruing to them. However, as we have 
noted, foreign participation may come about through investment and collaboration activities as 
well. For such activities a larger domestic research system may be advantageous to foreigners as 
it may offer (1) access to a large pool of germplasm and breeding lines developed by the public 
sector (2) access to a pool of trained manpower (plant breeders). A larger research system may 
also offer greater opportunities for collaborations with domestic companies. Therefore, the 
coefficient for the size of the domestic research system could be positive or negative.  
 
The number of grants to foreigners can generally be expected to increase with the age of PVP 
legislation. In the initial phases of PVP, grants to foreigners may be limited as foreigners take 
time to get familiarised with the system and see how effective enforcement of rights is going to 
be. Once the legislation is seen to be effective, foreign participation may increase. But it is also 
possible that the early phases of PVP may see a surge in grants to foreigners as they seek 
protection for (transferable) varieties that can be introduced in the domestic market. After the 
initial surge and with growing competition from domestic breeders, grants to foreigners may 
decline. The coefficient for PVPAGE could be positive or negative. 
 
 Greater openness of the economy may also induce a larger number of grants to foreigners. This 
is likely to be the case when the development of new varieties by foreigners is a result of their 
local investment in the seed industry and/or research. The coefficient for EFI can be expected to 
be positive. The results of the count data regression model based on the Poisson random effects 
specification are presented in Table-5.  
 
Table-5: Determinants of PVP Grants to Foreigners – Count Data Regression Results 




Number of observations: 
236 




Variable Co-efficient  Standard 
Error 
b/Std. Error  P-value  Mean of X
Constant -12.6703  0.8098 -15.644 0.0000   
Ln (MARKET)      0.9511  0.0436   21.794 0.0000  15.965
LN (PATENT)   10.9678  0.6879  15.943 0.0000    1.323
INTERACTION     0.6489  0.0373 -17.370 0.0000   21.23
Ln (GBRDPP)     0.4161  0.0108     3.837 0.0001      4.96
EFI     0.1850  0.0065     2.836 0.0046     7.998
PVPAGE     0.2880  0.0006   42.336 0.0000   15.283
Alpha 
 
   0.1043  0.0372     2.789 0.0051   
R
2
PEARSON   = 0.7747   
R
2
DEVIANCE  = 0.7340 
Log-likelihood of Poisson regression with no group effects  =-2996.340 
Restricted log-likelihood of Poisson regression with no 
group effects (all βs =0) 
 
=-9308.841 
Log-likelihood of Poisson effects with group effects 
(random effects specification) 
=-658.6119 
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There is no universal definition of R
2 in non-linear models. The commonly used “pseudo-R
2 
statistics for Poisson models are the R
2
PEARSON and the R
2
DEVIANCE. The high values of these two 
statistics (0.77 and 0.73 respectively) suggest that the overall fit of the model is good. All the 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level of significance and have the expected signs. The log 
likelihood of the Poisson model with random group effects represents a considerable 
improvement over the log likelihood of the model without any group effects. This shows that 
taking account of the unobserved heterogeneity of individual countries improves the fit of the 
model. The elasticities of the dependent variable with respect to the explanatory variable are 
given in Table-6. The values have been calculated at the overall mean of the explanatory 
variables. 
 
Table-6: Elasticities of PVP Grants to Foreigners 
Dependent Variable: PVP Grants to Foreigners 
 
Elasticity of dependent variable w.r.t.   
Strength of IPRs                                         (εIPR)  0.6 
Size of market                                           (εMARKET)  0.09 
Size of domestic research system            (εGBRDPP)   0.041 
Openness of the economy                            (εEFI)  0.14 
Age of PVP legislation                             (εPVPAGE)  0.048 
 
The elasticity of grants with respect to the strength of IPR variable is positive. This suggests that 
a stronger IPR regime will induce greater participation by foreigners in the acquisition of PVP 
grants. However, it should be noted that εIPR is the sum of two terms: 
εIPR  = δ Ln (NRGRANT)  = b2 -  b3 Ln (MARKET) =10.967  - 0.6489*15.965 =0.6 
δ Ln (PATENT) 
While the coefficient of Ln (PATENT) i.e. b2 is positive, the term b3*Ln (MARKET) is negative 
and reduces the elasticity. The negative coefficient of the interaction term can be seen as the 
“competition effect”. While stronger IPRs may encourage foreigners to seek more grants, the 
same IPR regime also creates incentives for domestic breeders to seek grants. The competition 
from domestic breeders tends to reduce the value of εIPR. Similarly, the elasticity of grants to 
foreigners with respect to the size of the market is also positive. A larger market size induces a 
larger number of grants to foreigners. But once again, εMARKET is composed of two terms: 
εMARKET  = δ Ln (NRGRANT)  = b1 -  b3 Ln (PATENT) =0.9511  - 0.6489*1.323 =0.09 
      δ Ln (MARKET) 
 
While the coefficient of Ln (MARKET) is positive, the term b3*Ln (PATENT) is negative and 
reduces the elasticity. Following the argument in the previous paragraph, the negative interaction 
term could be seen as the result of competition from domestic breeders.  
The positive elasticity of grants to foreigners with respect to the size of the domestic research 
system suggests that a larger domestic research system may offer certain advantages to 
foreigners.  As already noted, these advantages could lie in the availability of domestic 
collaborators, access to local trained manpower or access to germplasm collections etc. As 
expected, greater openness of the economy to trade and investment induces greater participation 
by foreigners in the acquisition of PVP grants. The positive elasticity with respect to the age of 
PVP legislation suggests that foreigners may seek more grants once they are familiar with the 
domestic PVP system (and see it as being effective). 
 
Determinants of Foreigners’ Share of PVP Grants 
For determining the share of foreigners in PVP grants the equation used was:   13
CUMSHAREit  = Constant  +  b1 Ln (MARKET)it + b2 Ln (PATENT)it +                          
b3 INTERACTIONit + b4Ln (GBRDPP)it + b5PVPAGEit + b6EFIit 
 
where i indexes countries and t indexes time periods. 
CUMSHAREit = Cumulative share of foreigners in PVP grants and the other variables are as 
defined previously. CUMSHAREit was derived from the WIPO data set, which contained data 
on the total PVP grants made to residents and non-residents. 
 
The random effects specification was chosen for the panel data estimation, as the country 
specific effects were not expected to be correlated with the explanatory variables. The results of 
the estimation are presented in Table-7. 
 
Table-7: Determinants of Share of foreigners in PVP Grants- Panel Regression Results 




(Cumulative share of 
foreigners in PVP grants) 
Number of observations=255 
Mean  =  0.2544  Standard deviation 
=0.08609 
Independent variables: 




P-value  Mean of X
Constant 0.0174  0.0276   0.632 0.5272 
Ln (MARKET)  0.0748  0.0111  6.720 0.0000  7.175
LN (PATENT)  0.0410  0.1673  2.455 0.0141  0.5943
INTERACTION 0.0742  0.0118 -6.285 0.0000  9.533
Ln (GBRDPP)  0.0199  0.0155 -1.284 0.1991  2.220
EFI  0.0526  0.0141   3.717 0.0002  3.609
PVPAGE  0.0017  0.0017   1.027 0.3044  7.055
R
2=0.502  Autocorrelation of residuals 0.16 
Hausman test statistic for fixed effects versus random effects =2.90 (6 




The overall fit of the model is reasonable with an R
2 of 0.502 and all the coefficients have 
plausible signs. The coefficients for the variables denoting size of the market, strength of IPRs, 
interaction of IPRs with market size and the openness of the economy are highly significant, 
while the coefficients for the size of the domestic research system and the age of PVP legislation 
are not significant. The elasticities of the cumulative share of foreigners with respect to the 
explanatory variables are given in Table-8. The elasticities were calculated at the overall mean 
of the (untransformed) variables. For comparison purposes the elasticities of the share of 
residents in PVP grants with respect to the independent variables is also given along side. 
 
Table-8: Elasticities of Share of Foreigners in PVP Grants 
Dependent Variable:   Share of foreigners in 
PVP grants 
Share of residents 
in PVP grants 
Elasticity of dependent variable w.r.t.     
Strength of IPRs                                        (εIPR)  -1.39 +1.757 
Size of market                                    (εMARKET) -0.036  +0.046 
Size of domestic research system       (εGBRDPP)           -0.035  +0.045 
Openness of the economy                          (εEFI) +0.753  -0.95 
Age of PVP legislation                       (εPVPAGE) 
+0.048 -0.06   14
 
The elasticity of foreigners’ share with respect to the strength of the IPR variable is negative. It 
is given by: 
εIPR =  [b2  + b3*Ln (MARKET)]*(1/CUMSHARE) = -1.39 
 
Though the coefficient of Ln (PATENT), i.e. b2, is positive, the elasticity is negative because the 
term (b3* Ln (MARKET)) is negative. We have already seen that the strength of the IPR 
variable has a positive impact on the number of grants to foreigners. Therefore, the negative 
elasticity of foreigners’ share implies that stronger IPRs provide greater incentives for 
innovation to domestic breeders than they do to foreign breeders. Our sample is confined to 
developing countries and such an effect may arise only when domestic research capability exists 
and can respond to PVP incentives. But such an effect may well obtain in developing countries 
that have a large National Agricultural Research System.  
 
The elasticity of foreigners’ share with respect to market size is also negative. It is given by: 
 εMARKET  =  [b1  + b3*Ln (PATENT)]*(1/CUMSHARE) = -0.036 
Here again, though the coefficient of Ln (MARKET), i.e. b1, is positive, the elasticity is negative 
because the term (b3* Ln (PATENT)) is negative. We have seen that a larger market size 
induces a larger number grants to foreigners. The negative elasticity of foreigners’ share with 
respect to market size may, therefore, be due to the fact that a given increase in market size 
induces a still larger increase in grants to residents. 
 
The elasticity of foreigners’ share with respect to the size of the domestic research system is 
negative. But the coefficient of Ln (GBRDPP) is not significant even at the 10% level of 
significance. The negative sign of the coefficient is consistent with the observation that a larger 
domestic research system may offer greater competition to foreigners and thus reduce their 
share. The elasticity of foreigners’ share with respect to the openness of the economy is strongly 
positive and coefficient of EFI is highly significant. This shows that the participation of 
foreigners in the acquisition of PVP grants depends not only on the legislation that is put in 
place but also on other factors determining the openness of the economy to trade, investment 
and foreign participation in economic activity.  
 
The insignificant coefficient of PVPAGE suggests that the age of PVP legislation is not a 
significant determinant of foreigners’ share. However, we must note that our sample comprises 
20 developed countries where high levels of enforcement can be expected. The situation may 
well be different in developing countries newly introducing PVP legislation where foreigners 
may choose to wait and assess the effectiveness of legislation and the enforcement of rights 
before they seek protection for their varieties.  
 
Taken together, the results of panel data model on the determinants of the share of foreigners in 
PVP grants and the count data model on the determinants of the number of grants to foreigners 
allow us to draw the following conclusions in the context of developed countries: 
a)  Stronger IPRs and a larger market size tend to increase the number of grants to foreigners 
but reduce the share of foreigners in total grants – which may be the result of competition 
from domestic breeders or PVP providing greater incentives for innovation to domestic 
breeders.  
b)  A larger domestic research system tends to increase the number of grants to foreigners but 
reduce the share of foreigners in PVP grants (though the latter effect is not significant). 
c)  Greater openness of the economy increases both the number of grants to foreigners as well 
as the share of foreigners in PVP grants.  
d)  Increasing age of PVP legislation increases the number of grants to foreigners and also the 
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Appendix 1: Inter-Regional Flows of Protected Varieties 
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Appendix 2: Major Inter-Country Flows of Protected Varieties in European Countries 
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Total   68.6%  73.9%  29.5%  70.14%  80.2%  77.17 
*As explained in the text, EU-CPVO refers to varieties initially protected in a EU country and subsequently offered 
for protection on a EU-wide basis through the CPVO. 
** The large share of Czech Republic- Slovakia “flow” of varieties only reflects the fact that varieties protected in 
Czechoslovakia continued to enjoy protection in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia after the separation of the 
two countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 